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GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE UK

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GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE UK

1.1. GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES

National government
In 1998 Policy Appraisal for Equal Treatment (PAET) guidelines for equal treatment for race, sex and disability and were jointly issued by Home Office (race), DfEE (disability) and Cabinet Office (women) to all government departments. How the guidelines were to be implemented or monitored was left to individual Departments to decide internally. While marking a major step forward towards the adoption of the principle of gender impact assessment of all policies, the actual guidelines can be considered to provide a rather weak interpretation of gender mainstreaming, focusing more on ‘gender proofing’ (McKay and Bilton 2000; Beveridge et al. 1999)- ensuring that policies are not unlawful and if they have negative impacts on groups that these impacts can be defended as consistent with policy objectives. There is no suggestion of using the guidelines to build into policy making pro-active gender equality policies. Moreover as the guidelines cover race and disability as well as gender there is no specific indication of the types of gender issues which would need to be taken into account in the application of the guidelines. The absence of machinery for monitoring and evaluation represent a further problem.

Box 1: Policy Appraisal for Equal Treatment

1. Check how your policy or programme will affect, either directly or indirectly, different groups of people - for example women and men, disabled people and those from different ethnic groups.

You will need to be sure that the measures will not result in unlawful discrimination

You will also need to consider the question of unequal impact on those groups who do not enjoy specific legal protection but who, as a matter of good policy, you wish to consider, such as older people or groups toward whom specific policy initiatives are being directed, such as young unemployed people.

2. Identify whether there is any adverse differential impact on a particular group or groups and then decide whether it can be justified in policy terms even if legally permissible

3. Take action if necessary.

http://www.womens-unit.gov.uk/99/equal.htm
In part in recognition of these problems with PAET the Women’s Unit has
developed a draft framework for assessing the impact of policies on women
(gender impact assessment). This framework is more explicitly targeted at
gender issues and also adopts a more proactive approach to gender impact
assessment. It focuses not just on whether policies are lawful or if differential
effects can be justified but suggests policymakers in designing policies ask
questions such as “what do I do in order to make sure my policies take account
of the different needs of men and women, when do I do it and how”? The
framework is in the process of being piloted by a few key departments but the
draft version of the gender impact assessment tool has been made available to
the public through the Women’s Unit website and is also to be included on the
Policy Makers Checklist (part of the Regulatory Impact Unit website). Feedback
on the draft version is being invited from government departments and others
before the framework is finalised. The framework makes explicit the need to
accept and value equally the differences between women and men and the
diverse roles they play in society. This provides a more adequate framework for
gender mainstreaming than the UK government approach which has equated
mainstreaming with targeting all disadvantaged groups. This focus on the specific
dimension of gender mainstreaming is followed through by the stress on
assessing policy using gender relevant criteria. Also in contrast to PAET, the
focus is not on gender proofing and justifying existing policies but on introducing
gender impact assessment at an early stage in the decision making process so
that changes and even the redirecting of policies can take place. The introduction
to the framework also points to the danger of assuming policies are ‘gender
neutral’ when that assumption will simply perpetuate ‘gender blindness’. The
framework provides examples of policies that are often not identified as having a
gender dimension: for example transport policy. Overall the framework endorses
a more transformatory approach to policy making, describing gender impact
assessment as challenging the assumption that policies, programmes and
legislation affect everyone in the same way by: taking into account the different
needs of women and men by making sure that both groups are served by the
proposal; detecting and assessing any differential impact on men and women so
those imbalances can be redressed before the proposal is endorsed. Six steps to
gender impact assessment are identified: defining the issues and goals,
collecting data, developing options, communicating, monitoring and evaluating
(see box 2). If adopted and implemented, the framework would represent a much
more significant step forward than the PAET which in many respects could be
said to be mainly a confirmation of good practice within a government bound by
sex discrimination legislation. It is therefore likely to be much more problematic
for this framework to be fully endorsed by government. Moreover it will raise the
question of how to combine gender mainstreaming with impact assessment for
other groups, such as by race or disability. In practice the development of a more
specific gender impact assessment approach also paves the way for more
satisfactory impact assessment by race, disability and for other groups as it
identifies that impact assessment requires more than a simple concentration on
participation and involves, for example, valuing of diversity and identification of areas where policy is race-blind or disability-blind as well as blind-blind.

**Structural funds**

The Department for Education and Employment is taking the lead in developing a Mainstreaming action plan for Great Britain, orientated first towards Objective 3, but with the intention of it acting as a template for Objective 1 and 2 regions. A draft of the plan has been presented to the Monitoring committee. However, as the plan has not yet been approved it is not yet in the public domain. The plan follows the UK government approach to mainstreaming, that is including race and disability along with gender and focusing on targeted groups. The Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, the Disability Rights Commission and others have been involved in drawing up the plan and in developing an Equal Opportunities Selection and Appraisal Project Checklist as the first element in a proposed ‘Toolkit’ for implementing the equal opportunities dimensions of the structural funds. This has also been presented to the committee but has not yet been adopted. The checklist was regarded as being rather ambitious in scope and training in equal opportunity appraisal and awareness building would be necessary before such a checklist could be implemented. The immediate priority has thus become that of training and piloting the checklist. The checklist, inter alia, focuses on ensuring that projects have accurately assessed the position for the targeted groups prior to the policy, shown understanding of barriers to entry and progression in the labour market, have consulted with and are in contact with local partners, have devoted adequate resources to equal opportunities, are taking care not to promote stereotypes, have made provision for care arrangements and for flexible timing and appropriate transport arrangements and will monitor and evaluate outcomes. For Objective 1 and Objective 2 regions the responsibility for developing equality impact assessment at present has been devolved to the regions. Each programme will have to draw up its own mainstreaming action plans and the GB Monitoring committee will work with each programme to ensures that equal opportunities is ‘on the agenda’ and that ‘good practice’ is shared. However currently the DETR does not have any central information related to developments at the regional level with respect to gender mainstreaming and gender impact assessment procedures.
Box 2: A Toolkit for Gender Impact Assessment: Draft issued by Women’s Unit, Cabinet office

**Step One: Define Issues and Goals** Identify the goals and objectives, and analyse the problems and concerns so that main factors affecting women and men are taken into account. Make sure the outcomes enable women and men to make an equal contribution to the economy and to society.

**Ask:** What is the policy trying to achieve? Does the policy affect women and men differently? Has previous work thrown up gender considerations for this policy? Is the policy meant to overcome gender inequalities or eliminate barriers, if so should there be a gender equality objective? What do men and women, including women’s organisations and those from disadvantaged groups say about the goals and issues?

**Step Two: Collect Data** Consider what information is required to inform the policy-making process or to develop policy options. Request information from national and community-based organisations and consider consulting women’s and men’s groups, who may have information and aspects that are new to Government. You can find them through the WNC: see Appendix B Source of Expertise or through the Government Offices. Build in time to allow them to consult internally, as they have limited funds and resources and probably work through volunteers. Consult departmental research and statistical units, they will help with the design and analysis of data collection, with consultation and interpreting the facts and findings from a gender perspective.

**Ask:** What is the gender make-up of the people affected by the policy? How can data be broken down by gender? What other information apart from statistics is needed to understand the issue?

**Step Three: Develop Options** Use the results of the research and data collection to help develop the policy recommendation or policy options. Present the recommendation or options in terms of impacts and implications for giving women and men equal access to policy benefits.

**Ask:** How does the recommendation or each option disadvantage or benefit women or men? Does the recommendation or any of the options reinforce or challenge traditional or stereotyped perceptions of women and men? Which option gives men and women real choice and an opportunity to achieve their full potential in society? Is there a need to consider mitigation where there will be a negative impact, and what action can be taken to reduce the impact or to create a more gender balanced policy?

**Step Four: Communicate** The strategy used to communicate the policies can play a significant role in acceptance and implementation. Timing, choice of media, language, and public involvement are important to ensure that government intent and the impacts of the policy, programme and legislation are understood.

**Ask:** How does the policy reflect the government’s commitment to gender equality? Are separate approaches necessary for communication to be effective for women and men? Have gender-inclusive language, symbols and examples been used in the materials communicating the policy?

**Step Five: Monitor** Monitoring is the continuous process of scrutiny and examination of the impact of the policy on women and men. It helps determine how well programmes are meeting their goals and provides opportunities for improvements.

**Ask:** Do plans for monitoring include a measure for gender impact? How can women’s groups and men and women in the community help in monitoring the outputs and outcomes? Do indicators and targets incorporate gender equality objectives? Are there measures in place to initiate an investigation or to change the policy if it is not delivering the equality objective defined at the outset of the project or equality of opportunity for women or men?

**Step Six: Evaluate** To be effective, policy-making must be a learning process that involves finding out what works and what does not, and making sure others can learn from it too. This means lessons learned from evaluation must be available and accessible to other policy-makers.
Local government

Local authorities have taken some initiatives to mainstream equality issues, often with regard to the provision and utilisation of services. These initiatives link in to other dimensions of public policy such as the best value initiative with respect to services and the policy of social inclusion. There are no national guidelines although the Local Government Management Board (LGMB- now renamed The Employers Organisation for Local Government) has piloted equality performance indicators (McKay and Bilton 2000). There are also a number of projects currently developing benchmarks and handbooks on mainstreaming generic equalities. There is a project which involves the gender and race equality agencies- the CRE, the EOC- and the Employers’ Organisation for local government aimed at developing an equalities standard for local government, covering race, sex and disability equality. The standard will generate performance indicators and benchmarks to facilitate monitoring. This new standard will replace the 1995 racial equality standard (REMQ) (McKay and Bilton 2000). The EOC has also provided a framework (see figure) of the essential elements for implementing mainstreaming in local government although there are no examples of local authorities implementing such an holistic model (McKay and Bilton 2000).
Figure 3.3: Mainstreaming Local Government: EOC Framework of Key Components

Wales

The Welsh Assembly has a statutory duty to promote equality. All Assembly secretaries must take equal opportunities into account in every policy decision and must publish an Annual Report on the effectiveness of arrangements. The Equal Opportunities Committee oversees this work. As the Welsh Assembly is a new institution the Equality Unit has first undertaken an audit of existing practices within the 57 divisions which come under the auspices of the Assembly. This baseline survey, conducted through semi-structured interviews with the head of division, has been used to classify current practice along five dimensions: consultation, commitment, training, monitoring and evaluation and business strategies, with each division ranked from ‘innocence to excellence’ on a five point scale. The classification was assessed by an independent panel working in conjunction with the EOC, the CRE and the DRC. These baselines will be used to assess progress towards the policy of promoting equality for all through the annual reports. There is no plan at present to develop Assembly wide guidelines on how to conduct equality impact assessment or on how to monitor and evaluate policies for equality impacts. Instead the divisions are being encouraged to develop their own procedures, suitable for their own activities; an Assembly wide approach may not, it is felt, be able to address the diversity of activities and the diversity of equality issues within the divisions. Moreover, although the approach focuses on equality for all, the Equality Unit has recognised the need to identify the distinctive issues associated with race, gender and disability. In the case of gender it has set up its own ‘listening to women’ project, in parallel to the national listening to women project carried out by the Women’s unit in the Cabinet Office in London. This exercise is being used to develop an agenda for promoting gender equality in Wales, while the issue of race equality is being taken forward through responses to the issue of institutional racism in public bodies, highlighted by the influential McPherson report into the police handling of the murder of a black teenager.

The commitment to equality issues within the activities of the Welsh Assembly is demonstrated by the inclusion of equal opportunities as one of three major themes for the work of the Assembly, along with sustainable development and tackling social disadvantage. Box 3 published by the Welsh Assembly provides concrete examples of how equal opportunities will be carried forward in the economic and employment development activities of the Assembly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Box 3 A better stronger economy</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOME OF THE THINGS WE WILL DO TO PURSUE OUR MAJOR THEMES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Build an advanced, competitive and more diverse economy, with a dynamic small and medium enterprise sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable development:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assist the shift towards environmentally-friendly economic growth, by encouraging service and knowledge-based businesses and encouraging best practice, including greater energy efficiency within industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pursue a course of developing Wales as a global showcase for clean energy production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage the development of strong environmental goods, services and renewables industrial sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social disadvantage:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Break down some of the barriers to starting up businesses with growth potential by establishing the Development 'Bank' or Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Target our economic development effort so that job opportunities are improved for those in deprived areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage people, including those in disadvantaged areas, to be creative and turn good ideas into new businesses through the implementation of the agreed elements of the Wales Entrepreneurship Action Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage the formation of more business in the social economy sector</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equal opportunities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage more flexible human resource practices and job opportunities through the development of more service and knowledge-based businesses and exploiting the potential of information and communication technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ensure the widespread provision of quality childcare to enable parents to train and work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social disadvantage:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implement Objective One programme, which will be of particular benefit to deprived communities in the Valleys and the west of Wales: the strengthening of Credit Unions will also contribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increase the proportion of Assembly financial assistance to companies in relatively deprived areas, such as the west of Wales and the Valleys, to offer new opportunities to those who currently experience social exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reduce unemployment and inactivity amongst groups which have traditionally experienced high unemployment, such as young people, lone parents, black and ethnic minorities, disabled people and the over 50s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Increase opportunities for people and communities who are disadvantaged by giving a stronger emphasis to the social economy in our economic development strategies.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equal opportunities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implement action on equality of opportunity as a cornerstone of all European Structural Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social disadvantage:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Take account of the likely impact on the environment of new companies and projects when making grants and agreeing schemes under Objective 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable development:</strong></td>
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<td>- Increase opportunities for people and communities who are disadvantaged by giving a stronger emphasis to the social economy in our economic development strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promote a sustainable future for agriculture and forestry within a modern rural economy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable development:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage sustainable farming through an increased emphasis on agri-environment measures and organic production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social disadvantage:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regenerate rural communities by encouraging new forms of rural enterprise, including forestry, and assisting farming families to diversify through the Rural Development Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raise the international profile and influence of Wales and establish it as a first class place to live, study, visit and do business</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social disadvantage and sustainable development:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage a Tourism Strategy which will help benefit rural areas and create a wider range of job opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stimulate development that conserves natural resources and respects the environment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable development:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intensify our Business and Environment campaign activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop a strategic framework for energy matters in Wales</td>
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Source: National Assembly for Wales Strategic Plan for Wales www.betterwales.com
Scotland

The Scottish Parliament has made significant commitment to the principles of both mainstreaming and equality audits, certainly in comparison to the national parliament. According to Standing Orders of the Scottish Parliament, all Executive Bills should be accompanied by a statement of their potential impact on equal opportunities. A mainstreaming check list (see Box 4 below) to assist Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) has been produced as a result of collaboration between the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality and the University of Edinburgh Governance of Scotland Forum (McKay and Bilton 2000).

**Box: 4 Mainstreaming Equalities: A Checklist for MSPS**

1. What is the policy for? Who is the policy for? What are the desired and anticipated outcomes?
2. Do we have full information and analyses about the impact of the policy upon all equalities groups? If not, why not?
3. Has the full range of options and their differential impacts on all equality groups been presented?
4. What are the outcomes and consequences of the proposals? Have the indirect, as well as the direct, effects of proposals been taken into account?
5. How have policy makers in the Executive demonstrated they have mainstreamed equality?
6. How will the policy be monitored and evaluated? How will improved awareness of equality implications be demonstrated?

Source: McKay and Bilton 2000

This commitment at the Parliament level is also feeding through into structural funds programmes and local authorities. The Scottish Executive, working with the Equal Opportunities Commission commissioned the development of a Toolkit to act as a resource for the preparation of all the Structural Fund programmes in Scotland. Box 5 summarises the content of the Toolkit including the suggested approach to Gender Impact Assessment. This approach follows firstly the EC’s Gender impact Assessment approach- known as SMART (Simple Method to Assess the Relevance of policies To gender), where differences between men and women in relation to the policy are assessed according to the four dimensions of participation, resources, norms and values and rights. If the policy is deemed to be relevant to gender, the next stage is to use the Flemish gender impact assessment tools based on identifying the gender dimensions of the proposal, estimating the size of possible impacts and modifying proposals where appropriate. The Toolkit has been used to prepare the Scottish Objective 3 programme. Moreover, the West of Scotland Objective 2 region, through its Equal Opportunities Focus Group has been ‘institutionalising the process of
gender mainstreaming for the 2000-06 round of programmes with respect to target setting, identifying indicators and adapting the monitoring and evaluation process to the need to measure equality outcomes.’ (Fitzgerald 2000 and box 6)

Box 5: Toolkit for Mainstreaming Equal Opportunities in the European Structural Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Plan Preparation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of the Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish regional profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collect Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Define mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Check policies and projects for potential unequal implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Gender impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identify gender differences in participation, resources, norms and values, rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carry out 3 stage gender impact assessment – identifying gender dimensions of proposals. Estimate magnitude of impacts and modify proposals to prevent negative impacts and where possible promote positive ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Develop a matrix showing the various programme priorities on one axis and the equal opportunities objectives to be achieved on the other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phase 2: Implementation

Project management issues
- Supportive institutional framework
- Project generation, appraisal, selection and scoring
- Publicity and information
- Monitoring and evaluation

Project promoters and partners

Source: Fitzgerald (1999) Toolkit for Mainstreaming Equal Opportunities in the European Structural Funds, Scottish Executive
BOX 6: SEP EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOCUS GROUP
STRATEGIC EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT

In the West of Scotland, consideration of equal opportunities has been a consistent feature of programme development. As already mentioned, the Equal Opportunities Focus Group acted as a resource and support throughout the process.

Formal Strategic Equal Opportunities Assessment has taken place at three main stages:

- Firstly, broad equal opportunities issues were mapped against different economic themes (infrastructure, enterprise, learning, and inclusion) in advance of the priorities and measures being drafted.
- Secondly, a more detailed assessment of the scope of priorities and measures was undertaken. As a result suggestions were made and incorporated into the body of the Programme.
- The third stage of the assessment shows the final position and is summarised below; key interactions are identified, with positive action for equal opportunities incorporated into the description and scope of measures accordingly.

The key interactions identified are:

*Measure 1.1 Competitive Business Base* will have a positive impact on the Equal Opportunities Objectives to Extend and Focus Entrepreneurship. The impact in terms of focusing entrepreneurship is likely to be over the long term and the extent of impact will be contingent on the targets set and criteria adopted for assisting new and existing Sees.

*Measure 1.2 Competitive Location* will have a positive impact on the Equal Opportunities Objective to ensure equality of access to economic opportunities through development of the physical and social infrastructure of the region (encompassing location, transport, safety, security, dependant care) and in particular access to new Information and Communication Technologies.

*Measure 1.3 Competitive Workforce* is likely to have a positive impact on issues such as labour market segregation.

*Measure 2.1 Community Area Regeneration* has a potential for significant positive impact across all equal opportunities policy themes, in particular Access, contingent on the incorporation of equal opportunities into SIP strategies.

*Measure 2.2 Addressing Barriers to Economic and Social Exclusion* will have a positive impact on the Equal Opportunities Objectives of Balanced Labour Market and Access.

*Measure 2.3 Routes to Opportunities* will have a positive impact on the Equal Opportunities Objectives of Balanced Labour Market and Access.

Source: Fitzgerald (2000)

**Northern Ireland**

The Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires public authorities, in carrying out their functions relating to Northern Ireland, to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity. The newly established Equality Commission is responsible for overseeing the implementation of Section 75 of the Act. Public bodies are
required to prepare Equality Schemes for approval by the Equality Commission which state how they propose to mainstream equality and promote good relations in public decision making. An essential part of the development of Equality Schemes is the carrying out of equality audits. Box 7 summarises the guidelines that have been issued on how these are to be conducted. There is considerably more emphasis on these guidelines than on others issued with respect to impact assessment (for example PAET for national government) on the development of alternative policy options if adverse impacts are predicted or on the development of policies to mitigate the adverse effects. Public authorities are in fact advised that they must consider a range of options and to show they have taken into account mitigation issues on decision making.
BOX 7: PROCEDURE FOR THE CONDUCT OF GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Commission considers that equality impact assessment requires seven separate elements:

1. **Consideration of available data and research**
   Quantitative, qualitative and evaluative research should be used; where necessary research and data collection should be commissioned and systems established for the systematic collection of information, paying attention to consultation with relevant groups in the collection of information.

2. **Assessment of impacts**
   The public authority must decide whether there is, or is likely to be, a differential impact, whether direct or indirect, upon the relevant group (or groups). In the case of an adverse effect policy makers should assess whether the policy is unlawfully discriminatory (taking into account that some policies require or permit affirmative or positive action). Even if the policy is not unlawful, policy makers will need to consider if the policy is justifiable, indeed necessary in order to promote the equality of opportunity of a particular group. If this is not the case, policy makers must consider whether there is any alternative measure which would achieve the aim desired without the differential impact identified.

3. **Consideration of measures which might mitigate any adverse impact; and alternative policies which might better achieve the promotion of equality of opportunity**
   The consideration of mitigation and alternatives is identified as a crucial elements of the process: authorities must develop options which reflect different ways of delivering the policy outcome. Mitigation can take the form of lessening the severity of the impact or providing some other remedy, where the adverse impact cannot reasonably be reduced. Clear evidence of the mitigation of impacts must be apparent in the policy assessments, and details of mitigation and its implementation must be included in the final recommendations. Evidence of the consideration of mitigation must be presented during decision making. Consideration must be given to whether separate implementation strategies are necessary for the policy to be effective for the relevant group. Options should be assessed for: how they further or hinder equality of opportunity; reinforce or challenge stereotypes; the consequences for the group concerned and for the public authority of not adopting an option more favourable to equality of opportunity; the means by which the relevant group be advised of the new or changed policy or service; the costs of implementing each option; whether the social and economic costs and benefits to the relevant group of implementing the option outweigh the costs to the public authority or other groups (evaluation of net social benefits for each option); whether international obligations would be breached by, or could be furthered by
each of the options. Clear evidence of the consideration of the impacts of alternatives must be apparent in the relevant policy documentation. The realistic consideration of the impacts of reasonable alternatives must be evident in any final recommendation to policy makers. Justifications must be given if these alternatives have not been accepted.

4. Formal consultation
An equality impact assessment requires consultation with relevant interest groups as well as the Equality Commission, other public bodies, voluntary, community, trade union and other groups with a legitimate interest in the matter. Wide publication of the consultation exercise is essential to inform the public and relevant groups about the policy being assessed, and to invite comments on it. The information used by the public authority in assessing the impact of the policy must be made available on request to those consulted. This will include any quantitative and qualitative data and other documentation such as consultants’ reports.

5. Decision by public authority
The legislation requires that in making any policy decision the public authority shall take into account any equality impact assessment and consultation carried out in relation to the policy.

6. Publication of results of equality impact assessment
The legislation requires public authorities to publish the results of equality impact assessments.

7. Monitor for adverse impact in the future and publication of the results of such monitoring.
A system must be established to monitor the impact of the policy in order to find out its effect on the relevant group. This must be reviewed on an annual basis and the results published. Monitoring must be carried out in a systematic manner. If the monitoring and evaluation show that the policy results in greater adverse impact than predicted, or if opportunities arise which would allow for greater equality of opportunity to be promoted, the public authority must ensure that the policy is revised.

1.2 GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

In many respects it can be argued that the UK has an abundance of policy evaluation material and has a strong track record in providing data disaggregated by gender. On this basis the UK might be expected to be rather further advanced than other countries which are less rich in statistical studies and data than the UK. However, despite this apparently rich pool of information, the analyses presented by government bodies of employment policies and practices tend to lack any real analysis of gender. Some, as we will see below, lack any gender disaggregation, but even when gender is introduced it is used primarily to provide a single set of disaggregated tables by gender, with any causal explanations offered limited by and large to women’s role as mothers. Aspects of the gendered labour market which cannot be entirely or mainly attributed to the direct impact of childbirth— for example pervasive segregation and pay discrimination— are recognised but there is no explanation of these differences or any attempt to analyse whether the policy under reconsideration will reduce or reinforce gender differences in the labour market. Given the very rich pool of information available in the UK, from government, academic and consultancy sources, the strategy we have adopted to provide a survey is to summarise the information available in Labour Market Trends in 2000 and 1999. This publication provides an overview of research and evaluation both conducted within government departments and by outside bodies funded by government. It also provides information on relevant publications and research conducted independently of government: this is not comprehensive, but a full survey would be an enormous task outside the scope of this report. The approach taken here has been to identify any reports and evaluations related to employment policies, highlighting both those reports and evaluations which address gender issues and those where a gender dimension is absent, even though there are prima facie reasons for expecting a gender dimension to be important. We do not provide full summaries of the evaluations; instead we identify either the key findings from a gender perspective or the main ways in which the study failed to include a gender dimension.

Active labour market policies

i) New Deal

There are a large number of evaluations of the New Deal both published and in progress (see gender impact assessment of the New Deal in section 2 of this report). Over the period 1999-2000 a number summaries of evaluations were published in Labour Market Trends. Most of these evaluations made no explicit reference to gender or provided gender disaggregated statistics. This lack of a gender dimension was not the result of the report being summarised; analysis of most of the reports in their longer versions also reveals a lack of disaggregation by gender. The following examples indicate some of the topics which were studied but where either no gender dimension was included or it was inadequately developed:
Report on New Deal for ethnic minority participants (Moody February 2000) did not provide a gender analysis even though there are major differences in the labour market experiences by gender by ethnic minority group. For example, the previous issue of *Labour Market Trends* provided a summary of a Joseph Rowntree Foundation study (Berthaud 1999) showing a widening gap between the experience of young Caribbean men and other ethnic groups in labour market experience. Similarly we know from a range of studies that there are major differences in participation rates and employment patterns between women belonging to black, Asian and white ethnic groups. These patterns are not systematically related to the experience of men from the same ethnic groups.

An evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents (Hamblin April 2000) focuses primarily on satisfaction scores among participants in the New Deal programme. Some attention is paid to aspects of the programme with implications for gender, for example the take up of the opportunity to claim for childcare: for example reference is made to the low take up as registered childminders were not being used. However, there is no general analysis of the labour market situation facing women and female lone parents in particular. The impact of gender segregation, the concentration of part-time work in low level jobs and the stability of jobs open to participants in the New Deal for Lone Parents were not included as part of the evaluation.

An analysis of leavers from the New Deal (Walker et al. October 1999) does state that being female is one characteristic, along with other characteristics, which leads young people to leave the New Deal quickly. However, there is no analysis of why this may be the case, nor of the destinations of women leavers relative to male leavers.

An evaluation of New Deal pilots (Atkinson et al. April 2000) makes no reference to gender, even though attitudes of employers were one of the factors explored. The likelihood that the gender of the clients taken on could be a factor in employer attitudes was not directly addressed. In the same issue an evaluation of employers role in the New Deal for Young People (Elam and Snape March 2000) again made no reference to gender, even though employers undoubtedly play a major role in the continuing gender segregation of employment opportunities among young people.

An exploration of the New Deal leavers who have unknown destinations (Hales and Collins 1999) was not disaggregated by gender even though there could be expected to be significant gender aspects to leaver behaviour. The factors behind their destinations being unknown might be quite different; more young women may perhaps drop out of the labour market for domestic reason while more young men may be involved in the informal economy, for example.

ii) Job seekers’ allowance
An evaluation of the impact of the introduction of the Job seekers’ allowance to replace unemployment benefit (McKay et al. November 1999) did not provide a full analysis of the impact by gender even though many aspects of the change may be expected to have gender effects - for example the switch from 12 to 6 months entitlement based on contributions (women are less likely to be able to claim means tested benefits), the focus on active job search (which may conflict with care responsibilities), the requirement to be available for 40 hours of work and at work at all times or to justify lack of availability on the basis of care responsibilities with the decision whether to allow these variations at the discretion of the officials. The report did reveal an interesting and notable difference by gender, that is that earnings for male JSA leavers declined significantly compared to male earnings of unemployment benefits leavers - from £179 pre JSA to £153 post JSA while those for women actually rose from £115 to £122. The factors which may lie behind these developments - perhaps that men are more likely to be able to achieve a higher wage through prolonged job search than women, or that wages for less qualified men have been falling relative to wages for less qualified women - were neither identified as hypotheses nor investigated.

iii) Structural funds

An evaluation of ‘pathways to employment’, an ESF Objective 3 programme (Allen et al. January 2000) found that women were more likely to be in a job 6 months after leaving an ESF project. However, this result was identified as not necessarily enhancing equal opportunity as the ESF programmes were also in danger of reinforcing gender segregation, echoing earlier critiques of gender segregation reinforcement in training and active labour market programmes (Felstead 1995). It is perhaps notable that a more considered gender analysis is found in programmes where the application of gender mainstreaming is under the scrutiny of the EU.

iv) Training

Evaluations of training programmes also failed to identify gender dimensions. A report on training and development of flexible workers (Rix et al. October 1999) has information which can be used to infer differences by gender but these are not made explicit. Instead data is presented by contract type - full-time permanent versus part-time, self employed, casual, agency, homeworkers, fixed term contracts etc. The gender inferences require some knowledge of gender concentration by employment form and there is no explicit gender analysis. Similarly the finding that flexible workers at higher levels are expected to be ready trained and skilled is not analysed for its implications for gender; for example it provides some clues as to why non standard forms are concentrated in lower level jobs, a tendency which tends to perpetuate gender disadvantage in the labour market. An analysis of the Training for Work programme controlled for gender but did not attempt to analyse or account for gender effects (Payne et al. July 1999). Two articles provided evaluations of the Modern Apprenticeship Scheme; this scheme had been heavily criticised when introduced for having a low participation
rate for young women and the DfEE has cited the changes made to this programme as a key example of the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming. However, while the changes have increased the participation rate of young women to close to that of young men, this has been achieved through widening the range of jobs in which apprenticeship are held and effectively allowing for the continuation and even intensification of gender segregation. One of the articles (Howarth and Stone February 1999) makes reference to the female participation rate and to the high level of segregation but provides no analysis or comment on these patterns. The other (Middlemas September 1999) states that a gender analysis will be undertaken when there is a larger sample for evaluation. However, analyses are provided by sector and no reference is made to the already known pattern of gender segregation by sector.

**Flexibility and working time**

i) Family friendly
A study of family friendly working in SMEs (Dench et al. March 2000) appears to take as its starting point an assumption that companies will normally see these issue as related to women. It thus does not comment on those companies where these policies were considered to be solely a women’s issue; instead the novel points apparently that ‘in a number of companies, domestic responsibilities were not simply addressed as a women’s issue’. One factor which led to such policies being considered of relevance to men was the presence of some senior male managers with their own family problems and care responsibilities.

ii) Time-related unemployment
The August 1999 edition provides an analysis of time related unemployment (Jenkins and Laux 1999), where by the extent of under employment by working time was measured. This reveals considerable underemployment among part-time workers. However, the notion of time-related unemployment does not appear to inform the government’s employment strategy; the focus in the NAP was on satisfaction with part-time hours, and not on the extent of time related unemployment.

**Tax and benefits**

i) An EOC report on ‘The Lower Earnings Limit in Practice: Part-time employment in Hotels and Catering’ (Purcell et al (1999), reviewed in February 2000) explores the impact of the National Insurance threshold whereby neither employers nor employees pay National Insurance contributions if earnings fall below a certain amount per week. The report found that employees had little understanding of the link between earnings and benefits. Variations in earnings on a weekly basis often led to employees making contributions on an irregular basis. These contributions failed to help them build up benefit credits as contributions only count if they are paid or credited regularly over the year. The report recommended the lowering of the threshold; this has not been followed through in government policy. Indeed the
threshold has been raised since the research was carried out and only those affected by the rise in the threshold have had their benefit entitlements protected through contribution credits.

ii) An evaluation of the possible implications of a policy to extend in work benefits to those without family responsibilities was carried out by Marsh et al (October 1999). The sample identified as potentially eligible for the scheme was broken down by gender (56% female, but with women constituting one third of the unemployed sample and 60% of the employed sample). However, the reasons for the differences in gender make up of the sample were not analysed or commented upon, nor was there any attempt to identify the longer term implications of such a scheme for gender equality, household participation patterns etc. One finding, that employers saw the scheme as helping keep down wage levels, was not analysed or its implications for the gender pay gap.

Pay
i) National Minimum Wage (NMW)
The contents of the second report of the Low Pay Commission (2000) were summarised in the March 2000 edition. This report clearly identifies the gender impact of the National Minimum wage, with two thirds of the beneficiaries identified as women and two thirds of these being those in part-time work. The report also comments on the fact that there is no evidence that the NMW has slowed up job creation in low paid segments. There is no comment or analysis of the implications of these trends for understanding the processes which explain the continuation of the gender pay gap or the widening of part-time and full-time differentials over recent years.

ii) A seven country study of the family pay gap conducted by researchers at the LSE (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999) is reported in the February 2000 edition. This study shows that the cost of having children- the family pay gap is largest in the UK. Again these findings have not been acted upon in developing the NAP or introduced into the assessment of the situation with respect to gender equality in the UK.

Summary of survey of policy evaluations
This survey of the articles in Labour Market Trends points to two important conclusions. First in most areas of evaluation of employment policy there is still no systematic introduction of a gender analysis and where gender is used as a variable, the analysis is limited simply to an investigation of participation rates. The links between gender difference and the operation of a gendered labour market are often not mentioned let alone used as a basis for analysis. The second conclusion is that where studies do reveal important gender differences, these findings, although available to the government, are not integrated into government thinking and policy analysis. These problems identified in policy evaluations and in the policy making process can in turn be related in part to deficiencies both in the
statistical methods and assumptions used in employment policy analysis and to the political approach taken to gender impact analysis.

1.3. Barriers to gender impact assessment

Statistical barriers to gender impact assessment

A major barrier to gender impact assessment arises out of the continuing use of statistical methods or categories which obscure gender effects and focus the analysis on apparently gender neutral categories. The most important of these barriers is the use of household rather than individual analyses for modelling the impact of tax, benefit and employment policies. Individual analyses can be readily broken down by gender while household analyses prevent a gender analysis. While problems remain in presenting an individual analysis particularly when benefits and taxes are household based, some attempt needs to be made in this direction if there is to be both gender impact analysis of policies and a raising of awareness of the gender impact of policies (Sutherland 2000). Analysis by household obscures intra household differences by gender and also fails to take into account that household formation may only be temporary; a policy which benefits low income households but which perhaps creates disincentives for the partner to enter the labour market may not be of long term benefit to both partners if the household subsequently dissolves.

A second methodological barrier to the development of gender impact assessment is the failure to adopt gender as a cross cutting variable for all analyses. The purpose of gender disaggregation is not simply to identify differences by gender in participation rates but to see how gender interacts with all performance variables in the policy evaluation. Even if no discernible gender differences emerge this in itself is an interesting finding, given the prior knowledge that we have that labour markets are structured by gender. Statistical analyses start from the presumption of no gender bias or difference unless shown otherwise; but this approach makes no use of prior knowledge of the strong prevailing patterns of gender differences in the labour market measures by a whole range of variables from occupational concentration, pay levels, working time contracts, job tenure, unemployment rates etc.

The third problem which can be identified is the continued use of statistical categories which are implicitly or explicitly gender biased. UK employment rate and working age statistics continue to use different categories by gender despite the commitment to equalise pension ages and despite the tendency for withdrawal from the labour market to vary more by pension entitlements and job displacement than simply by gender. Another example of continued gender bias is the use of benefit claimants rather than the ILO definition of the unemployed. Women who are without work but who want to work are much less likely to be included among benefit claimants than among the ILO unemployed. New Deal programmes are only available to benefit claimants and to partners of benefit
claimants, indicating that the policy is not aimed at raising employment rates but at reducing benefit claimants. This policy objective is more likely to favour men than women but this is not made explicit in policy analysis and evaluation.

**Political and institutional barriers to gender impact assessment**

The limited development of gender impact assessment cannot be attributed to statistical problems alone; instead it must reflect a lack of developed political will. To some extent this lack of political will to focus on gender impact assessment is related to the policy to address mainstreaming issues for all disadvantaged groups within the same policy assessment agenda. This focus on target groups and on disadvantage tends to deflect attention away from the ways in which gender affects the whole way in which the labour market is organised. Gender segregation of jobs and contracts leads to differences in the ways in which jobs are valued, graded and paid and to different working time conditions and contracts. A focus on a whole range of disadvantaged groups reduces the analysis to the position of the groups within the current labour market structure and not on how disadvantage and discrimination by gender in the past and in the present shapes that structure, through influencing the organisation of jobs, pay and working time. The second reason for a lack of political commitment to gender impact assessment arises from the clear government priority attached to dealing with social exclusion and child poverty through a policy of moving households claiming benefits back into work. This policy objective takes precedence over and in some respects clashes with that of gender mainstreaming, as our analysis of the Working Families Tax Credit policy makes clear.

References


2.1 Gender Impact Assessment of Working Families Tax Credit

The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) is designed to overcome some of the perceived problems of low participation in paid work associated with the twin problems of moving off benefits into work and the low wage levels available to those who are on benefits (Gregg and Wadsworth 1995; Gregg et al. 1999a). Making work pay has been one of the major objectives of the new Labour government. While the National Minimum Wage has a role to play in this strategy, the government has placed more emphasis on making work pay, not through raising wages but through providing more generous in work benefits to those in work with childcare responsibilities and by providing a smoother transition between reliance on benefits and entry into paid work. WFTC replaces the existing Family Credit in work benefit system; the main differences between the two schemes are:

a) A more generous level of in work benefits, providing higher subsidies and to those in households with higher levels of income

b) A lower rate of withdrawal of benefits (reduced from 70% to 55%)
c) more extensive and generous allowances for childcare costs
d) payment as a tax credit rather than as a benefit and as a result, payment through the wage packet rather than to the carer unless otherwise specified by the household.

The policy is designed to move households off welfare and into work; there is no explicit gender equality objective, but the development of childcare credits and the focus on moving single parents into work has been cited by the government as evidence of their commitment to women’s employment. In its discussion document on modernising Britain’s tax and benefit system, the Treasury acknowledged the important role of women’s employment in couple as well as lone parent households in helping families and children move out of poverty (HM Treasury November 1999) but the impact of WFTC on women’s employment did not form part of the analysis. As with all policies aimed at households, the likelihood of differential effects by gender is very strong. Our aim here it to identify the likely gender effects, using both a priori analysis of the different position of men and women in the labour market and drawing on the existing evaluations of WFTC, carried out by other bodies, providing gender disaggregated data.

The position of men and women prior to policy development

Participation
Overall women have a lower participation in employment than do men. However, the focus of the policy is to reduce the number of households dependent on welfare; thus the major perceived policy problem was not the low employment rate of women but the rising share of ‘work poor households’. Unemployed breadwinners, most of whom were either male heads of couple households or female single parents were perceived as being excluded from entering the labour market because of first the high risks associated with moving off benefits. These risks include not only potential loss of income where benefits pay more than the job but also the risk of losing entitlements to benefits if the job proves unsatisfactory and the job taker is deemed not have quit the labour market voluntarily. The second barrier to entry is the low level of pay (both hourly pay and part-time hours) associated with jobs available to the unemployed. Most new jobs were seen as being taken by those in households with already someone in work- i.e. mainly married women - and this trend was identified by government as a policy failure. As such the lower integration of women in the labour market was not taken to be a problem unless they were in workless households. Women’s individual right to seek employment was not seen as a policy priority.

Resources
Second income earners were discouraged under the previous in work benefits system – Family Credit- both by the high rate of marginal tax on second earners (70%) and by the absence of significant help with childcare costs. However, Family Credit was paid direct to the main carer, a policy which increased women's direct access to income even if the overall system discouraged their
participation in wage work. This discouragement to participation, however, has long term implications for women’s access to income and to pension entitlements: the problems apply to lone parents as well as to women in partnerships.

**Norms and values**

Family Credit was considered to be insufficient to overcome male prejudice over taking on low paid and/or part-time jobs, deemed more suitable for women. Minimum reservation wages for men in couple households have been found to be higher than for female lone parents or wives (Marsh and McKay 1993). Gender segregation in labour market has therefore tended to be preserved despite high unemployment among men which might be expected to increase competition in the low wage segments. Childcare costs remain primarily an obstacle to women’s participation as they are seen as a charge against women’s current earnings and not as either a joint responsibility nor as a necessary cost (or form of investment) to maintain links with the labour market.

**Rights**

Individual rights to enter or to remain in work or to have an independent income were compromised by a household based benefit system which restricted entitlements to retain earned income to very low levels of £5 per person or £10 per household. However, within the taxation system the principle of independence has been established, a principle potentially jeopardised by the development of WFTC.

**Trends in men’s and women’s position prior to WFTC**

Employment rates of lone parents and among female partners of the non employed have been a source of policy concern as they are low by international standards and are associated with the growth of workless households (see table 1 for employment rates of mothers by family type and age of youngest child). Lone parent employment rates have fallen since the 1970s (from 66% in 1979 to 44% in 1998) but had been rising prior to WFTC but by a lower rate than the rise in mothers’ employment in couple households (Moss et al. 1999). The share of the population of workless households rose from 10.9% in 1981 to 17.9% in 1998 (Gregg et al. 1999a)

**Priority to be attached to gender equality promotion.**

The main objective of the government is to reduce work poor households and to reduce child poverty, not to promote gender equality: mothers’ employment appears to be seen in positive light by Treasury primarily as it assists in removing children from poverty. Two factors suggest a low priority to gender equality; there is little or no attention to the impact of WFTC on incentives to participate for women in couple households, nor is the situation of lone mothers once their children reach the age of 18 addressed.
Impact of policy

Participation

Table 2 shows the considerable rise in the number of claims under WFTC compared to Family Credit: an increase of over 25% between August 1999 and February 2000, with the WFTC coming on line in October 1999. The largest rise over this time period has been in couple household claimants, but taking the period 1997 to 2000 there has been a 50% increase in lone parent households receiving in work benefits and only a 20% increase in couple households. Lone parent households now constitute more than half of all claimants. Table 3 shows that among lone parent claimants the female share is 96% while among couple households only 21% have the female partner as the main earner. Overall among the couple household claimants less than 15% have both partners in work (table 4), but we do not have data on the distribution of working partners by male or female main earner categories. If we assume that all the households where both partners work have male main breadwinners, we could estimate that out of the couple households, around 36% of the female partners are in work. This represents the upper limit. This corresponds to the overall employment rate for mothers with a non working partner, much below the share of all mothers in couples who are in employment at 69% (see table 1). WFTC may therefore be helping the non working male partner into work but this process does not alleviate the disincentive effects on the second partner moving into the labour market.

There has also been a notable rise on the share claiming childcare credits, from 40.5 thousand in 1999 to 96.6 thousand in 2000 (table 5). The majority of claims are made by lone parents, both under the old and under the new system, but the greater opportunity for couple households to claim under WFTC is evident in the rise from 1.4 to 9.1 thousand households between 1999 and 200, while claims by lone parent households rose from 39.1 thousand to 87.2 thousand.

While there is some data on claimants, assessment of the impact on participation rates in employment must still rely on model building for the effects as there is not yet sufficient information related to actual impact. According to estimates by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the WFTC reform is likely to bring between 29 and 34 thousand female lone parents into the labour market and between 11 and 15 thousand currently inactive female partners of the unemployed, but at the same time is likely to lead to the withdrawal from the labour market of 20 to 29 thousand women currently in work but in households where the man is already in employment (see table 6). Although the IFS has identified this potential negative impact of WFTC on women in married couples, they state that as the aim of the policy was to reduce workless households this effect would probably be regarded as less important than the positive impact on lone parents and spouses of the non employed (Blundell and Reed 1999). The two main models shown in the table differ in their estimates of the impact of WFTC on male participation in
households where the man’s partner is working. This is because Gregg et al.’s (1999b) model only considered entry to employment not exits. The relatively high decline in male participation in the Blundell et al.’s (1998) model reflects an assumption that men will also respond to incentives to leave the labour market brought in by WFTC when their partner is in work. However, it is a point of debate whether males are likely to withdraw voluntarily from the labour market and allow their spouse to be the main earner simply in response to these incentives. Even if it were more beneficial for the man to leave as the lower earner, this might not be the behaviour in practice. Overall tax disincentives to participation are likely to have a more significant impact on women, particularly as the nonworking spouse would be responsible for childcare and the childcare credit is not available to couples where only one person is in work.

Resources
With respect to the value of WFTC awards, there is evidence of somewhat higher awards on average to female lone parent households and to couple households where the main earner is female (see table 4). These higher awards are likely to reflect the large gap between earnings and income needs in these households and not because of a more generous treatment for these households. Indeed there is strong evidence that households headed by women are likely to be treated less generously on average than male headed couple households or male single parent households. That is because the latter are much more likely than the former to receive an extra credit for one person working for at least 30 hours per week. Three fifths of households receiving these extra credits are headed by men, while overall these households only account for around 40% of all claimant households. This thirty hour credit appears to discriminate against those who can only participate between 16 and 30 hours in the labour market, a category to which most lone parents are likely to belong. Moreover couple households are not allowed to pool their hours of work to qualify for the additional credit; there are thus built in resource disincentives for dual part-time working in the WFTC system (Women’s Budget Group 1999; Kelly 2000). Overall there is some evidence that the whole package of benefit changes including the introduction of WFTC has led to more resources being directed towards women in the economy (Sutherland 2000). Nevertheless there may be some longer term costs associated with this redistribution. A critical question must be the effect of more generous in work benefits on the dynamics of wages at the bottom end of the labour market. If employers become increasingly familiar with the effects of WFTC and assume that those taking low paid jobs can rely on the government to provide additional income subsidies there may be increasing unwillingness to improve pay at the lower end of the scale. This could have negative consequences for the gender pay gap as many women are in low paid jobs but are not eligible for WFTC. Moreover the major benefits for lone parents are held to derive from the reintegration of groups such as lone parents into the labour market, to provide a basis for the development of skills and the long term escape from poverty and social exclusion. However, even government ministers are beginning to be concerned that current policies for one parents focus simply on
getting lone parents into work and do not pay enough attention to providing the training and other resources needed to turn that employment opportunity into the basis of an employment career. Instead many lone parents return to unemployment and inactivity as jobs prove unstable, unsatisfactory or incompatible with childcare. (Guardian 7.9.2000)

Norms and values
The availability of childcare credits may help to facilitate women’s return to the labour market as childcare costs are often seen by households as a charge against women’s earnings, thereby inhibiting participation by women. However, within WFTC a nonworking spouse would have to take responsibility for childcare and childcare credits would not be available. This may prevent women in non working households taking the initiative in moving the household off benefits and into work, with support form WFTC, as their male partners would be required to supply the childcare. WFTC in principle should allow men to take low paid/part-time jobs but these jobs may still not be acceptable to men. The decision to move from Family Credit to WFTC was in part related to an attempt to overcome prejudice against receipt of benefits; under WFTC recipients receive tax credits not benefits. This, however, has the consequence of changing the main recipient from the main care giver to the main wage earner, unless couples opt for a different arrangement.

Rights
The introduction of WFTC raises some issues for rights related to equality. First of all the switch form Family Credit to WFTC takes money taken from the carer as a right and gives it to the wage earner unless the couple opts for a different distribution. Secondly the WFTC is based on household income assessment, thereby effectively contravening the right to independent taxation. Independent assessment has never been recognised in the benefits system, so that WFTC may be seen as following in that tradition, but as WFTC affects a larger share of households than Family Credit, the whole principle of independent taxation could be said to now be compromised for low income households. Another right which may be challenged through the introduction of WFTC in combination with other measures is the right for lone parents and other parents to chose to provide care rather than enter the labour market. So far entry into the labour market has remained voluntary for lone parents but WFTC combined with the New Deal for lone parents under which lone parents claiming benefits are required to attend an interview for advice and information on employment issues places considerable pressure on lone parent to consider entering the labour market. There are widespread concerns that further moves towards compulsion, certainly once children are at school, may follow.

Impact of policy on particular groups of women and men.

Table 1 highlights the impact on participation rates of different groups of women depending upon their status as lone parents or as spouses of working or non
working partners. The positive effects in drawing lone parents and partners of non working men into the labour market are effectively held to offset the negative consequences for participation rates among women with working partners.

**Indirect and/or long term effects**
The indirect or long term effects on both gender equality and the welfare of children depend on take up of benefits, on reactions to the disincentive effects of the benefits, on the impact of changes in intra-household income distribution and on the responses by employers in the labour market. More generous benefits combined with a high take up rate could reduce the share of children in poverty, but these gains could be offset in whole or in part if the transfer of income from purse to wallet leads to less money being spent on children (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1998). A high take up of WFTC might be expected to break the cycle of deprivation, but this will not be the case if first of all the system jeopardises the provision of appropriate care for children and/or if entry into jobs through WFTC does not in practice lead to stable good employment. If employers respond to wage subsidies by reducing rates in low paid segments there could be a long term reinforcement of gender pay gap and gender income differences. However, gender segregation in part-time and low paid work could reduce as WFTC provides the basis for men to accept these types of jobs even when they have family responsibilities.

**Policy modifications**
Some policy modifications have already been proposed by the government. This includes developing an integrated child credit which will provide both cash benefits and help with childcare and will be available to all low income households, payable to the main carer. This reduces the problem that WFTC is paid to the wage earner not the carer. This provides in fact an example of policy modification where criticisms of a policy from a gender perspective - made in particular by the Women’s Budget Group, a lobby group consisting primarily of academics - have been listened to and are likely to be acted upon if the government remains in power. Another modification which is also being proposed is to extend WFTC system to couples without children. This would effectively mean that the main groups who work in low paid jobs who would not be eligible for in work benefits are young people and students- because of a likely age cut off- and those with a working partner, because of household means testing. This latter group would be primarily married women. This policy is therefore likely to further polarise the position of women on the labour market. The analysis of the policy from a gender perspective, as presented here, would argue against such an extension and indeed would argue for monitoring of the effects of the current policy on both the gender pay gap and on participation rates, disaggregated by groups. It is also clear that the gender equality perspective at a minimum requires in work benefits to be combined with policies to significantly raise the minimum wage as it is only in this way that individuals can be offered a minimum guaranteed reward for their own labour.
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Women’s Budget Group (1999) *Commentary on the Pre-Budget Report ‘Stability and Steady Growth for Britain’*
Table 1. Mothers’ employment rates by age of youngest child

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment rate by age of youngest child, %</th>
<th>Lone mother</th>
<th>All mothers in couples</th>
<th>Mothers with working partner</th>
<th>Mothers with non-working partner</th>
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<tr>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household LFS, Spring 1998 (HM Treasury 1999)

Table 2: WFTC and FC (Family Credit) awards by family type - Great Britain (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Couples</th>
<th>Lone parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>733.5</td>
<td>397.9</td>
<td>335.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1998</td>
<td>760.5</td>
<td>390.9</td>
<td>369.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>789.1</td>
<td>388.7</td>
<td>400.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>786.4</td>
<td>379.1</td>
<td>407.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>930.9</td>
<td>448.8</td>
<td>482.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2000</td>
<td>988.9</td>
<td>479.8</td>
<td>509.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inland Revenue (2000)

Table 3: Family type by employment status, average size of award and recipients of 30 hour credits (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Self employed</th>
<th>Employ-ees</th>
<th>Average size of award £</th>
<th>Number receiving 30 hour credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1025.5</td>
<td>140.8</td>
<td>884.7</td>
<td>70.78</td>
<td>571.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples</td>
<td>499.7</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>399.3</td>
<td>67.73</td>
<td>365.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male main earner</td>
<td>393.6</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>310.3</td>
<td>66.48</td>
<td>322.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female main earner</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>72.37</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone parents</td>
<td>525.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>485.5</td>
<td>73.67</td>
<td>205.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>62.69</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>504.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>468.7</td>
<td>74.13</td>
<td>189.6</td>
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</table>

Source: Inland Revenue (2000)
Table 4: Partners’ economic activity in couple households claiming WFTC/FC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Average award £</th>
<th>Average net partner earnings per week £</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All couples</td>
<td>499.7</td>
<td>67.73</td>
<td>9.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Couples partner</td>
<td>425.9</td>
<td>71.71</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>not working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples partner</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>44.77</td>
<td>62.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inland Revenue (2000)

Table 5: WFTC and FC awards for help with childcare (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Couples</th>
<th>Lone parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Inland Revenue (2000)

Table 6. Estimates of the impact of Working Families Tax Credit on Employment Rates (1998 budget figures for WFTC rates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gregg et al. (1999b)</th>
<th>Blundell et al. (1998)</th>
<th>Paull et al. (1999)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single parents</td>
<td>Estimated increase in employment thousands</td>
<td>Estimated increase in employment rate</td>
<td>Estimated increase in employment thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married women, partner not working</td>
<td>+28,600</td>
<td>+1.85</td>
<td>+34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married women, partner working</td>
<td>+14,610</td>
<td>+1.75</td>
<td>+11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married men, partner not working</td>
<td>-29,050</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married men, partner working</td>
<td>+16,820</td>
<td>+0.48</td>
<td>+13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>+32,770</td>
<td>+27,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blundell and Reed (1999)
2.2 Gender Impact Assessment of the employment-focused New Deals.
The employment-focused New Deals consist of six distinct, targeted programmes aimed at supporting labour market (re)insertion. These are:
1. The New Deal for Young People (NDYP)
2. The New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed (NDLTU)
3. The New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP)
4. The New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed (NDPU)
5. The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP)
6. The New Deal for the over 50s (ND50+)

The size, the type and quality of support and the compulsion to participate varies between the different New Deals, making it difficult to generalise across them. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between NDYP and NDLTU which are aimed at the claimant unemployed, and therefore at reducing the numbers of the unemployed and duration of unemployment, and the remaining programmes which target the particularly low levels of employment found within other claimant groups (namely, lone parents, disabled people and the over fifties). NDYP and NDLTU offer the most extensive programmes. Both begin with a ‘Gateway’ period in which assessment and guidance is offered. If employment has not been found after this period, the client moves onto one of a series of options. For both programmes these options include subsidised employment, training and education with the NDYP also offering voluntary work and work on an environmental task force. For the remaining New Deals the emphasis is on support and guidance offered by a personal adviser. For example, the NDLP offers measures such as free childcare to cover interviews as well as advice on building up a successful c.v. The emphasis across all New Deals is on ‘work first’, although some programmes offer provision aimed at enhancing the human capital of participants.

The New Deals have been one of the most heavily evaluated British social policy programmes. Nevertheless, the ability to get a true measure of the New Deals’ gender impact is compromised by the short time that many have been running and, for those programmes that were launched without a pilot, by the lack of a true comparator without which it is difficult to obtain a measure of ‘additionality’ (e.g. the impact of the programme in isolation from the generally favourable economic conditions). While gender disaggregated statistics are usually available, the evaluation of the gender impact of the programmes has been quite limited, and there has been no discussion of issues such as, for example, the contribution of the programmes to labour market segregation.

The position of women and men prior to policy development
Prior to the introduction of the first of the New Deals in 1997, a national programme of active labour market support was not in existence within the UK (Gardiner estimates that there were some 42 ‘welfare-to-work’ programmes in operation in 1997, but none operated at a national level or with the level of
funding commanded by the New Deals). In most cases, the claimant unemployed drew upon the (rather limited) support of the Employment Service, with financial support in the form of Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA).

**Participation**

Overall women had a lower labour employment rate than men, and lone mothers experienced particularly low employment rates. Men’s rate of registered unemployment was higher across all groups. Although there are well known difficulties in capturing fully levels of female unemployment women are nevertheless less likely either to be registered as unemployed or to be classified as unemployed using the broader ILO definition. However, women’s share of ILO unemployment is notably higher than their share of unemployment measured on the basis of claimant count. Moreover if we take into account those among the inactive who say they wish to work but are not counted as unemployed as they are not immediately available for work, the gender gap in numbers seeking work disappears (see table 1).

In 1997 at the start of the New Deal, of those classified as economically active, 5.9% of women and 8.2% of men fell within the ILO definition of unemployment. The figures in Table 2 shows that women experienced, on average, shorter spells of registered unemployment. Unemployment rates for young people were higher than for the general population but demonstrated the same gender differential.

**Resources**

The principal benefit targeted at the claimant unemployed was, and remains, JSA. Where both partners in a couple are unemployed, it is mostly men who register as the job seeker, compromising women’s direct access to resources. Women with an employed partner who have sufficient National Insurance contributions may claim contribution based JSA for 6 months, after which they will not be able to claim independent support if their partner is in work. For lone parents out of the labour market, it is more usual to be making a claim on Income Support. In all cases, the Government identified the negative consequences for family income of transiting from benefits to earnings as being the key barrier to taking up employment (Taylor 1998). Multiple interventions (i.e. the New Deal in combination with the Working Families Tax Credit) was seen as the solution, bringing with them the additional benefit of reducing the size of the claimant population and spending on social security (WFTC expenditure appears in tax records rather than as direct expenditure).

**Norms and values**

The Government identified two principal problems with the system prior to the New Deals. First, the lack of practical support to individuals who wished to overcome particular barriers to employment (for example, the organisation of childcare for lone parents). Support for the young unemployed was singled out as particularly important given the ‘scarring effects’ that an early experience of
unemployment had on later attachment to the labour market. Second, the benefits system allowed the unemployed and lone parents to remain ‘passive’ welfare recipients who received automatic entitlements. The architecture of the New Deals reflects the desire to introduce active policies which expect, and in some cases mandate, the participation of particular groups of benefit claimants.

Rights
Where both partners are unemployed, household based assessment of JSA means that individual rights to an independent income are compromised. For those partners of the employed who have a contributions record, an individual claim to JSA may be made for a six month period only. Partners without a contribution record will have little financial incentive to register as unemployed with long term consequences for their eligibility to National Insurance benefits such as the Basic State Pension.

Trends in women and men’s position independent of the New Deal
In the five years prior to the introduction of the New Deals, the unemployment rate for all women and men had fallen (albeit with an upward ‘blip’ for both in 1993) and similarly for young unemployed men (see Table 2). The picture is less clear for young unemployed women and for the long term unemployed of either sex who experienced fluctuations in the rate of unemployment from 1992-97 rather than a consistent fall. The economic circumstances in the three years following the introduction of the New Deals have been favourable and the overall ILO unemployment rate (5.8%) is now almost one and a half percentage points lower than it was in 1997.

The priority attached to gender equality
Gender equality is not an explicit objective of the main New Deals (NDYP or NDLTU) which have a largely male clientele (see below). Rather than ‘mainstreaming’ these New Deals, the approach has been to introduce separate programmes targeted at the predominantly female groups of lone parents and the partners of the unemployed. This has allowed for a tailoring of provision – for example, great emphasis is placed on help with childcare arrangements for participants in NDLP. In line with other UK policies, increased female employment may be desirable more as a means for achieving the goals of decreasing the numbers of benefits claimants, and lowering levels of child poverty, rather than as an end in itself. Thus, no programme is available to those women with an employed partner who are not part of the claimant population.

The impact of the policy
Participation
Participation in NDYP and NDLTU is compulsory and conditioned on a particular duration of registered unemployment. Attaching this condition to participation means that considerably fewer women are brought into these programmes. Up to the end of July 2000, 28% of the 519,000 participants in the NDYP were women and 16% of the 287,000 participants in the NDLTU (DfEE 2000a). These shares
are lower than women’s share of ILO unemployment and reflect their lower share of unemployment benefit claimants. By contrast, 94% of the 172,000 participants in NDLP are women (DfEE 2000b) and when fully rolled out, the sex composition of participants in NDPU is likely to be similar.

Gender differentials appear in the types of support received by New Deal participants. As Table 2 shows, in NDYP there are notable gender differentials in participation in the Voluntary Sector option (were women predominate) and the Environmental Task Force option (with a majority of male participants). In addition, women are slightly less likely to be in an employment option with a slightly higher chance of being in education and training. For the NDLTU, women are slightly less likely to be on the employment option. Of those who have already passed through NDYP, 41% are currently in sustained unsubsidised jobs compared to 16% of those who have left NDLTU (DfEE 2000a). Given that the other New Deals consists of just an advisory stage, there are no equivalent figures on the immediate destination of participants. However, for the longest running of these programmes, NDLP, some initial figures exist as to the short term effect on their claimant and employment status. Following participation in the New Deal, 13,000 lone parents (or 35% of all participants at that date) had moved into employment and ceased to claim Income Support, while 43% had withdrawn from the programme and continued to claim Income Support (Hasluck 2000:36). Fully estimating the impact of participation in the New Deals would, of course, require a longer time span in which to assess employment sustainability and the continuing employment prospects of participants. Several researchers have concluded that such programmes have a small, but positive, impact on employment among the client groups (e.g. Hasluck et al. 2000).

Resources

One can conceive of the New Deals as a resource to which individuals have access. From this perspective, the generosity of provision matters greatly, and from a gender perspective it is a matter of concern that of all New Deal expenditure 80% has gone on NDYP and NDLTU with their mainly male clientele. There are considerable differences in the unit cost of the New Deals. While the Government has yet to come up with official figures, one can make an initial, rough estimate of the unit cost which is of a similar magnitude for NDYP and NDLTU, standing at £1560 and £1370 respectively. For the NDLP, by contrast, the per participant spend is estimated to be approximately £700 or about half as generous reflecting the more limited support for training and education and the lack of a subsidised employment option.

At the individual level, there are also different resource implications of participation according to which New Deal is accessed, the options taken and the individual’s prior package of benefit claim. For example, participants on the subsidised employment option in NDYP receive the wage for that job in addition to any other benefits to which they are entitled, while those participating on the voluntary sector or environment taskforce option receive no more than when they
were registered unemployed. For lone parents, there are no pecuniary incentives placed on participation in the New Deal *per se*, rather the calculation of whether to move into employment is made on the basis of the specific job offer and changes in welfare entitlement (which, following the introduction of Working Families Tax Credit are likely to be particularly advantageous). For those participating in NDPU, finding employment will mean a pound by pound reduction in benefits received by the participant’s partner (see below), opening up the potential for conflict within the household.

**Norms and values**

For lone parents, personalised support during the transition to employment the New Deals, in combination with other tax and benefit changes and increased childcare provision, may enhance the employment rate of this group. However, targeting provision at lone parents creates a possible tension in the long term. The expectation that lone parents should combine their caring duties with employment is not matched by any similar expectation for partnered mothers. Conversely, demands for support may come from women whose lack of employment is not considered problematic by virtue of the fact that they have an employed partner. Possible gender stereotyping of the jobs taken by New Deal participants is also not seen as problematic. Hence, a much publicised option for lone parents is to take employment in the childcare sector, with just under a quarter of those lone parents who found employment working in personal and protective services, with clerical and secretarial, sales and routine unskilled jobs accounting for most of the remainder (Hasluck 2000: 37).

**Rights**

The combination of a New Deal programme targeted at individuals operating alongside a benefits system which employs family based assessment for benefits creates a number of difficulties. For example, where a partner of the unemployed participating in NDPU is successful in finding employment the earnings brought into the household will result in a pound for pound reduction in the payment made to the (usually male) Job Seeker. There is also a contradiction in granting partners of the unemployed the right to participate in the New Deal programme even though they have no right to receive benefits directly. In the near future, lone parents who have a child over the age of 5 will be required to attend an interview and assessment, with a penalty of a partial withdrawal of benefits if they do not comply.

**The impact of the policy on particular groups of women and men**

A conclusion to emerge from most evaluations of the New Deals is that they have been more successful in getting those who were already closest to employment into work, with those who have multiple disadvantages or who are among the longer term unemployed requiring more sustained intervention (Millar 2000). There has been close monitoring of participation among minority ethnic groups. Currently, 6% of all NDLP starts are from minority ethnic groups, with slightly lower proportions of minority ethnic lone fathers. Of all starts on NDYP 14% and
17% of female starters were from minority ethnic groups. Lastly, 10% of all starters in NDLTU were from minority ethnic groups, with similar figures holding across male and female starters. The percentages entering employment from the New Deals has varied considerably by region, reflecting local unemployment rates. A notable group excluded from all New Deal provision is women with an employed partner.

**Indirect and/or long term effects**

As the programme is recent in origin, the long term effects of the New Deals on gender equality within the labour market are not possible to assess fully at this point in time. However, as the vast majority of New Deal participants are men, drawn from a pool of claimant unemployed there may be a negative effect on the employment rates of women where they are in direct competition with New Deal participants in subsidised employment. However, the fears about substitution and of participants making repeated cycles through the New Deals appear not to have been realised (Millar 2000: 17). The emphasis on ‘work first’, particularly in NDLP and NDPU, does not address the longer term problem of low skills or, indeed, of the quality of jobs and longer term earnings prospects of these participants. Sustainable employment must be a longer term aspiration for New Deal participants and for lone parents, in particular, the constraints placed by caring responsibilities on sustaining employment need to be monitored closely.

**Policy modifications**

The Government has introduced policy modifications to the New Deals since their inception. These include the establishment of further New Deals, such as that for the over 50s, and the extension of the training option for lone parents. Increasing participation in NDLP and the constraints of childcare responsibilities for participants in NDPU have also been identified as particular problems (Hasluck 2000; Stone et al. 2000). The possibility of adding a New Deal for Labour Market Returners has also been discussed. Modifications could be made to the pool from which the different New Deals draw their participants. For example, NDYP and NDLTU could draw on those who had experienced repeated spells of unemployment or indeed other forms of absence from the labour market rather than the most recent spell of registered unemployment. Such changes would, however, be rendered more complex given the compulsory nature of these programmes. An alternative would be to improve the provisions, especially for training and possibly for subsidised employment, made by those New Deals that draw their participants from beyond the registered unemployed. Lastly, it has been suggested that support provided through the programme could be sustained over a longer period of time.

**References**


Table 1: Alternative measures of unemployment for the UK 1999
(numbers in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claimant count</td>
<td>963.5</td>
<td>299.5</td>
<td>-664.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO unemployed (16-59F/64M)</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>-428.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive but wants a job (16-59F/16-64M)</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>+437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO unemployed plus inactive but want a job</td>
<td>2039</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Market Trends April 2000 tables C.1, C.11 and D.2

Table 2: ILO unemployment by sex, age, and duration, 1992-2000¹.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>% unemployed for:</th>
<th>Youth unemployment rate²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 6 months</td>
<td>Over 24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
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<td>49.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<td>Men</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Spring quarter (March to May) 1992-1999; first quarter (January to March) 2000.
²Unemployment among 18 to 24 year olds.
Table 3: NDYP and NDLTU participants, end July 2000.

**New Deal for Young People - %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gateway</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education and training</th>
<th>Voluntary Employment</th>
<th>Environmental Task Force</th>
<th>Follow through ('000s)</th>
<th>Total ('000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed - %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Advisory Interview</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education and training</th>
<th>Work Based Learning</th>
<th>Follow through ('000s)</th>
<th>Total ('000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfEE 2000a.